Directed Duties

The Explanatory Power of Composite Reasons

If normativity is reducible to reasons, how should we understand directed duties (i.e. duties owed to right-holders) in terms of reasons?

In many ordinary circumstances directed duties should be understood as “composite reasons” – i.e. R(x) is a composite reason only if it is a molecular reason containing (i) a first-order reason for action combined with (ii) a (non-reducible) second-order reason to prevent (iii) an opposing first-order reason (or set of opposing first-order reasons) from being balanced against (i) the first-order reason.

These reasons are neither reducible to first-order reasons nor to Raz’s idea of protected reasons. There are two substantive implications for normative theory: the broadly accepted view that rights are simply weighty (first-order) pro-tanto reasons is too narrow (if not oversimplistic), and the so-called thesis of symmetry in legal theory becomes untenable.